The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on August 2 & 4, 1964,
and helped lead to greater American involvement in the
Vietnam War.
Fleets & Commanders:
US Navy Captain John J. Herrick
Gulf of Tonkin Incident Overview:
Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam.
These PTFs were manned with South Vietnamese crews and
conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North
Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. Originally begun by the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program
of covert operations against North Vietnam. After several early
failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its
focus shifted to maritime operations. In addition, the US Navy was
instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam.
A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to
conduct electronic surveillance operations.
The First Attack:
On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto
patrol off North Vietnam. Under the operational control of Captain
John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting
intelligence. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks,
including an August 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands.
Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in
Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. On the afternoon
of August 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were
dispatched to attack the destroyer.
Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters,
Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. Alerted to the
threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS
Ticonderoga. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were
vectored towards Maddox's position. In addition, the destroyer USS
Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. Not reported at the
time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if
the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. These
warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack.
Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on August
4. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the
ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another
North Vietnamese attack. Taking evasive action, they fired on
numerous radar targets. After the incident, Herrick was unsure
that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 AM
Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and
overeager sonar men may have accounted for many reports. No
actual visual sightings by Maddox."
After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking
further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in
daylight by aircraft." American aircraft flying over the scene
during the "attack" failed to spot any North
Vietnamese boats.
intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to
order retaliatory Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS
Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately thirty North Vietnamese vessels.
Subsequent
research and declassified documents
has essentially shown that the second attack DID NOT HAPPEN.
Approved on August 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of
Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military
MUST SEE!! MUST READ!!MORE STUPIDITY
1969-1970 Vietnam
Staff Sargent (E6 11B4P)
Air Medal, National Defense, Vietnam Campain,
Combat Infantry Badge etc.....
and helped lead to greater American involvement in the
Vietnam War.
Fleets & Commanders:
US Navy Captain John J. Herrick
Gulf of Tonkin Incident Overview:
Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country.
Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, PreidentJohnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam.
These PTFs were manned with South Vietnamese crews and
conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North
Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. Originally begun by the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program
of covert operations against North Vietnam. After several early
failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its
focus shifted to maritime operations. In addition, the US Navy was
instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam.
A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to
conduct electronic surveillance operations.
The First Attack:
On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto
patrol off North Vietnam. Under the operational control of Captain
John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting
intelligence. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks,
including an August 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands.
Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in
Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. On the afternoon
of August 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were
dispatched to attack the destroyer.
Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters,
Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. Alerted to the
threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS
Ticonderoga. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were
vectored towards Maddox's position. In addition, the destroyer USS
Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. Not reported at the
time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if
the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. These
warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack.
Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck
by ***a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun
bullet***.
After fifteen minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response,
Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from
the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to
continue with the Desoto missions.
The Second Attack:by ***a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun
bullet***.
After fifteen minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response,
Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from
the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to
continue with the Desoto missions.
Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on August
4. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the
ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another
North Vietnamese attack. Taking evasive action, they fired on
numerous radar targets. After the incident, Herrick was unsure
that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 AM
Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and
overeager sonar men may have accounted for many reports. No
actual visual sightings by Maddox."
After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking
further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in
daylight by aircraft." American aircraft flying over the scene
during the "attack" failed to spot any North
Vietnamese boats.
Aftermath:
While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the
second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were
convinced that it had occurred. This along with flawed signalsWhile there was some doubt in Washington regarding the
second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were
intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to
order retaliatory Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS
Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately thirty North Vietnamese vessels.
Subsequent
research and declassified documents
has essentially shown that the second attack DID NOT HAPPEN.
Approved on August 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of
Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam
War
(TOTALLY UNDECLARED and
UNNECESSARY) More than 58,200 US
Soldiers DEAD, Over 303,000 Wounded,
and 1,600 Missing.
(TOTALLY UNDECLARED and
UNNECESSARY) More than 58,200 US
Soldiers DEAD, Over 303,000 Wounded,
and 1,600 Missing.
************************
The Deaths, The Abuse, The Immorality, and The Insanity
***********************
MUST READ BELOW!
MUST READ BELOW!
The Tet Offensive A Brief Summary
of What Should Have Not Happened!
of What Should Have Not Happened!
MUST SEE!! MUST READ!!MORE STUPIDITY
*********************
GOD BLESS OUR VETERANS and THEIR FAMILIES
Mark Rienzie
E-mail: mrienzie@msn.com
Call for more information: 516-313-3112
Co D 75 Infantry LRRP - The Elite Combat Fighting Force
1969-1970 Vietnam
Airborne / Ranger Team Leader
5th Special Forces Recondo CERTIFIED
Staff Sargent (E6 11B4P)
38 Combat Missions - Never Lost a Man
Air Medal, National Defense, Vietnam Campain,
Combat Infantry Badge etc.....
Discharge: Honorable
